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ABSTRACT: It appears that light may be thrown on the nature of moral principles if 
they are construed as moral laws analogous to ceteris-paribus laws of nature. Luke 
Robinson objects that the analogy either cannot explain how moral principles are 
necessary or cannot explain how obligations can be pro-tanto; and that a disposi-
tional account of moral obligation has explanatory superiority over one in terms of 
moral laws. I outline the analogy, construing laws of nature as necessary relationships 
after the fashion of William Kneale and Karl Popper. I then show that Robinson’s 
objections are mistaken and that if the difference between a dispositional account 
and a law account is not merely verbal, then it is the law account that is superior. I 
also dispel the common confusion between the necessity of laws and the existence 
of forces.
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1. Introduction
A pro-tanto obligation is one that has weight but which may, in principle, be 
outweighed by conflicting obligations. When a pro-tanto obligation is out-
weighed, it nevertheless retains its weight, so that the failure to fulfil it leaves 
an unsatisfied moral demand for which is owed at least an acknowledge-
ment and, normally, some form of compensation (Thomson 1990, 91–96, 
98–103). Thus, a pro-tanto obligation is a real obligation that still exists even 
when it is outweighed. It is therefore essential not to confuse a pro-tanto ob-
ligation with a merely apparent obligation, since the latter is not a real obliga-
tion at all. Such confusion is committed by W. D. Ross (1930) who uses the 
term ‘prima facie obligation’ sometimes to talk of pro-tanto obligations and 
sometimes to talk of merely apparent obligations (see Searle 1980, 238–50). 
I eschew all talk of ‘prima facie obligations.’ Morality requires that an agent 
perform a pro-tanto obligation if it is not outweighed by another obliga-
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tion. A pro-tanto obligation contrasts with an absolute obligation, that is, 
an obligation that could never be outweighed. I assume here the commonly 
accepted view that no obligations are absolute and thus that all obligations 
are pro-tanto (for relevant discussion, see my 2014). Throughout, I use ‘ob-
ligation’ to mean moral obligation, ‘is obliged’ to mean has an obligation, and 
‘ought’ to mean is required by morality. I assume that morality is consistent 
and that this precludes morality requiring an agent to perform two actions 
when he is unable to perform both.
Ross (1930, 94) draws an analogy between pro-tanto obligations and 
physical forces. Paul Pietroski (1993) develops the point by assimilating 
moral generalisations to statements of laws of nature, arguing that a moral 
generalisation says that any person in a specific kind of circumstance acquires 
a pro-tanto obligation, as in,
(P1) anyone who promises has a pro-tanto obligation to do what is 
promised.
Since morality requires the performance of pro-tanto obligations that are not 
outweighed by other obligations, (P1) entails:
(P2) anyone who promises ought to do what is promised, so long as the 
obligation to do what is promised is not outweighed by a conflict-
ing obligation.
We could rephrase (P2) as:
(P3) ceteris paribus, anyone who promises ought to do what is promised.
Pietroski argues for the similarities between statements like (P3) and ceteris-
paribus statements of laws in the special sciences, such as biology and eco-
nomics; for example, the law-statement that, ceteris paribus, an increase in 
the supply of a product will be followed by a fall in its price. He says that the 
‘ceteris paribus’ qualification indicates that a law-statement has exceptions 
which can be explained in terms of an interference (1993: 495–96; see also 
Pietroski and Rey 1995, section 2.1).
Detailed exploration of the proposed analogy between moral principles 
and laws of nature promises to illuminate both, or at least the former; but I 
leave that for another occasion. My concern here is to rebut two objections 
to the analogy between moral principles and laws of nature which have been 
raised by Luke Robinson (2008, 2011, 2013, 2014). First, Robinson argues 
that, if statements of moral principles are construed as analogous to state-
ments of laws of nature, either they are not necessary or they cannot help 
to explain how obligations could be pro-tanto. Second, he contends that an 
account of pro-tanto obligations in terms of dispositions has explanatory su-
305D. FREDERICK: Moral Laws, Laws of Nature and Dispositions
periority over an account in terms of ceteris-paribus moral laws. I argue that 
Robinson’s objections are mistaken. Throughout I clearly distinguish laws 
from law-statements, the former being what make the latter true (if they are 
true).
In section 2, I briefly re-state and clarify the analogy between moral 
principles and laws of nature. In section 3, I outline Robinson’s first objection 
and I show that it is unsound. I also distinguish the necessity of laws from 
forces. In section 4, I recount Robinson’s second objection and I show that 
it is erroneous. I also argue that, if the difference between a dispositional ac-
count and a law account is not merely verbal, then a law account has explana-
tory superiority. In section 5, I conclude.
2. Moral and Physical Laws
It has been argued that a law of nature is a necessary relationship that may be 
expressed by a universal material-conditional preceded by a necessity opera-
tor (Carroll 1994; Kneale 1949: chapter 2; Popper 1959, appendix *x). Thus, 
a statement of a law of nature can be represented by means of the following 
schema:
(L) necessarily, anything, x, is such that, if x is G, then x is H.
The necessity operator in (L) implies that a statement of a law of nature has 
counterfactual instances. It is usually taken to express a special form of natural 
or physical necessity. However, following a suggestion of Saul Kripke (1980: 
final paragraph), we may prefer to take it as expressing metaphysical neces-
sity. For example, supposing that Newton’s Laws are laws of nature, Newton’s 
Second Law can be expressed in a statement of the form (L) as follows:
(a) necessarily, every body, x, is such that, if x is subject to a resultant 
force, then x has an acceleration proportional to the magnitude of 
the resultant force in the direction of the resultant force.1
Although it is a matter of some controversy (see, for example, Earman 
and Roberts 1999, Earman et al. 2002, Lange 2002, Pietroski 1993, Piet-
roski and Rey 1995), it is generally held that in addition to strict laws of 
nature, which admit of no exceptions, which exemplify the form (L), there 
are also ceteris-paribus laws of nature which admit an indefinite number of 
1 Strictly speaking, it is not (a) that exemplifies the form (L), but an instantiation of (a), 
in which the expression of generality, ‘a resultant force,’ and the two occurrences of its bound 
variable, ‘the resultant force,’ are replaced by a singular term designating of the resultant force 
acting in a particular situation. We can ignore that nicety here.
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exceptions, not specifiable in advance. A ceteris-paribus law of nature can be 
represented by means of the following schema:
(L’) necessarily, anything, x, is such that, if x is G and other things are 
equal, then x is H.
Thus, supposing that Boyle’s Law is a law of nature, it can be represented 
as a statement of form (L’) as follows:
(b) necessarily, anything, x, is such that, if x is a gas and x is held at a 
constant temperature and other things are equal, the pressure ex-
erted by x varies inversely with the volume of x.
Interfering circumstances that can disturb the inverse relationship between 
pressure and volume include forces exerted by gas molecules upon each other, 
the molecules’ sizes, their adhesion to the container walls, the container’s 
shape, and many others (Lange 2002, 411).
The form (L’) is a more specific form than (L), in which ‘G’ in (L) is sup-
planted by ‘G and other things are equal.’ Some true statements of forms (L) 
or (L’) do not express laws of nature; but I will not attempt to articulate the 
features which differentiate statements of laws of nature from all other state-
ments of those forms. The phrase ‘other things are equal’ is an idiom which 
can mean different things with respect to different ceteris-paribus laws. Per-
haps the most generally applicable formulation of its sense is along these 
lines: the effects of any interfering conditions are ignored or abstracted from (Pi-
etroski and Rey 1995: sections 2.1 and 3.2). However, in some cases it may 
be rendered satisfactorily by: there is no interfering condition. That is the sense 
in which the expression will be understood here, since, when moral law-state-
ments exemplify the form (L’), the ceteris-paribus clause may be interpreted 
in that sense.
An important part of morality is a set of moral principles or laws each 
of which connects a particular type of circumstance with a particular type of 
obligation. Statements of such laws include:
• one is obliged to keep one’s promises;
• one is obliged to pay one’s debts;
• one is obliged not to kill an innocent person.
For example, the first law-statement connects a person’s making a prom-
ise with that person’s obligation to keep the promise made. However, each of 
the statements has obligation-voiding exceptions. For example, if Tom prom-
ised to take Geri to the ball, then Tom has an obligation to take Geri to the 
ball; but not if Tom’s promise to Geri had been coerced or elicited by fraud 
or if it would be immoral for Tom to take Geri to the ball (Thomson 1990: 
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310–16); and perhaps there are other obligation-voiding exceptions. How-
ever, when the circumstances are not exceptional, their connection with the 
obligation is necessary. This can be seen from the fact that a statement of a 
moral law has counterfactual instances. For example, if Tom had not prom-
ised to take Geri to the ball (and the circumstances were relevantly similar), 
he would not have had the obligation to take Geri to the ball; and if it had 
been Spike, not Tom, who had promised to take Geri to the ball, then it 
would have been Spike who had the obligation to take Geri to the ball (as-
suming the circumstances were not exceptional). Thus, the moral-law state-
ment, ‘one is obliged to keep one’s promises’ is more accurately expressed in 
the following statement of form (L’):
(i) necessarily, any person, x, is such that, if x promises to φ, and 
there is no interfering obligation-voiding condition, then x has an 
obligation to φ.
Similar renditions can be given for the other moral-law statements in our 
bulleted list.
In addition to moral laws connecting circumstances with obligations, 
there are also moral laws connecting obligations to particular facts about 
what an agent ought to do. A statement of such a law is:
• one ought to fulfil one’s obligations
which connects an agent’s having a particular obligation to φ with the par-
ticular fact that she ought to φ. Some philosophers may be squeamish about 
according such a statement the title of ‘moral law-statement’ because it seems 
to be ‘analytic.’ However, that would be to assume that a distinction between 
analytic and synthetic propositions is tenable; and that is not an assump-
tion that I wish to make. Like the statements in our previous list, this moral 
law-statement has exceptions. These obligation-interfering exceptions are cir-
cumstances in which a person’s having an obligation fails to generate a cor-
responding fact about what that person ought to do, because the person has 
a conflicting obligation which outweighs it. For example, if Tom promised to 
take Geri to the ball, and also promised to pick up Spike from the hospital, 
and the circumstances of the two promises were not obligation-voiding, then 
Tom has an obligation to take Geri to the ball and an obligation to pick up 
Spike from the hospital. If it turns out that Spike is discharged from the hos-
pital at the time when Tom is due to take Geri to the ball, then Tom has an 
obligation to take Geri to the ball and an obligation to pick up Spike, but he 
cannot fulfil both. His obligation to pick up Spike, let us assume, outweighs 
his obligation to take Geri to the ball, so he ought to pick up Spike. But then 
his obligation to take Geri to the ball did not make it the case that he ought 
to take Geri to the ball; though it will make it the case that he ought to make 
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amends to Geri in some appropriate way, even if only by giving an explana-
tion for his failure. We cannot specify in advance all the types of situations 
in which a particular type of obligation will come into conflict with other 
obligations. For example, Tom’s obligation to take Geri to the ball might 
have been outweighed by obligations arising from other exceptional circum-
stances, such as other promises Tom made, debts he is obliged to pay (which 
claim the money he set aside to buy or hire a suit), unusual circumstances 
which preclude him from getting to the ball without killing an innocent per-
son, and so on. Still, the connection between an agent’s obligation and what 
the agent ought to do is necessary in non-exceptional cases. So we can more 
accurately express our moral law-statement concerning what agents ought to 
do in the following statement of form (L’):
(ii) necessarily, any person, x, is such that, if x has an obligation to φ, 
and there is no interfering obligation which outweighs it, then x 
ought to φ.
There is, of course, an important difference between moral laws and 
ceteris-paribus laws of nature, despite the structural similarities. A ceteris-
paribus law of nature, in conjunction with a particular type of circumstance 
featuring a specific body, will (other things being equal) make it the case that 
the body does behave in a particular way. In contrast, a moral law, in conjunc-
tion with a particular type of circumstance featuring a specific person, will (in 
the absence of interfering conditions) make it the case only that the person 
ought to behave in a particular way; and we know all too well that people 
often do not behave as they ought.
However, the fact that statements of laws of nature which require ceteris-
paribus conditions can be explanatory promises to throw light on how moral 
principles with ceteris-paribus conditions may be action-guiding and perhaps 
also how they may be tested. That, though, is a topic for a separate paper.
3. Laws, Necessity and Forces
Robinson argues that there are a number of ways of conceiving laws of nature 
but if moral principles are construed in those ways either they will not be 
necessary or it will be left unexplained how obligations may be pro-tanto. 
He proceeds by elimination, considering in turn different ways of conceiving 
laws of nature.
First, he considers conceiving laws of nature as Humean regularities; 
but, he says, statements of Humean regularities – for example, as conceived 
on the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis theory – impute no necessary connections, cannot 
explain the phenomena of which they are true, and do not entail counterfac-
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tual conditionals. Consequently, if moral principles were construed in that 
way, they would not be necessary (Robinson 2008; 2011: 293–96; 2014: 
sections 2 and 3). Robinson’s argument here covers well-worn ground and 
appears to be clearly correct, though it is usually taken to show (rightly, in 
my view) that Humean conceptions of laws of nature are mistaken (see, for 
example, Carroll 1994: chapters 1–3).
Second, Robinson considers conceiving laws of nature as involving a 
relation of necessitation between universals along the lines of Dretske-Too-
ley-Armstrong (DTA) theories. However, he says, David Armstrong’s meta-
physic contains non-dispositional states of affairs, types of states of affairs 
(universals) and relations between such types, but it does not contain things 
like forces which may outweigh one another. There is, he says, nothing in 
that metaphysic that would help to explain how it could be true that obli-
gations are pro-tanto, if moral principles were construed as laws of nature 
so conceived (Robinson 2014: section 5). This part of Robinson’s argument 
seems incomplete given that it seems to be directed at Armstrong specifically 
rather than at DTA theories generally; and since Armstrong actually accepts 
the existence of forces, as Robinson notes (2014: section 5), this part of Rob-
inson’s argument also seems flawed. Fortunately, we need not linger on it, for 
the crucial weakness in Robinson’s argument is in the next stage.
Third, Robinson says, ‘Taken together, the [Humean] regularity theory 
and the DTA theory exhaust the usual suspects for accounts of what a law of 
nature is’ (Robinson 2014: section 2). However, even if that quoted claim were 
true, it would not yield Robinson’s conclusion, because ‘the usual suspects’ 
do not exhaust the field. As we saw in section 2, there is another conception 
of laws of nature, namely, the necessary-relationship conception, which was 
suggested by William Kneale and by Karl Popper, each of whom is a signifi-
cant philosopher who should not be overlooked. Further, that conception has 
recently been developed and defended by John Carroll, who argues against 
the Humean and DTA conceptions (Carroll 1994: chapters 2–3 and appen-
dix A). The Kneale-Popper conception avoids Robinson’s criticisms of the 
Humean-regularity view, since statements of the forms (L) and (L’) impute 
necessary connections, entail counterfactual conditionals and can explain the 
phenomena of which they are true. It can also, as illustrated by (a) in section 
2, admit the existence of forces which may outweigh one another and, to that 
extent, can explain how obligations are pro-tanto. Therefore, a necessary-re-
lationship conception of laws of nature avoids Robinson’s objections.
The necessary relationship conception of laws of nature is inconsistent 
with a Humean or radical-empiricist ontology which denies the existence 
of necessities in nature and it can be conjoined with the affirmation of the 
existence of forces, as we noted. However, it is also consistent with the denial 
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of the existence of forces. This is worth noting because there is a tradition in 
philosophy of conflating the necessity of laws of nature with forces. That tra-
dition goes back to Hume, who often uses ‘force’ and ‘necessity’ interchange-
ably and connects them both with constant conjunction (1739: section xiv). 
The tradition was perhaps entrenched by Kant who, on the one hand, places 
‘under the category of causality the predicables of force, action and passion’ 
(1787: B108) and, on the other, says ‘the very concept of a cause so mani-
festly contains the concept of a necessity of connection with an effect and 
of the strict universality of the law’ (1787: B5; see also B123–24). However, 
we can envisage a half-hearted empiricist who admits that laws of nature 
are necessary relationships, because accidental generalisations cannot explain, 
yet dismisses as animistic all claims that there are forces in nature. Contrari-
wise, a critical rationalist, like Popper, can accept both necessary relationships 
(1959: Appendix *x) and forces (1982: 93–95).
Further, in the history of science, while some statements which have 
been accepted as expressions of laws of nature have spoken about forces, oth-
ers have not. For example, the statement of Newton’s First Law concerns 
force and inertia, the statement of his Second concerns force, mass and ac-
celeration, the statement of his Law of Universal Gravitation concerns force, 
mass and distance, the statement of Coulomb’s Law concerns force, charge 
and distance, the statement of Boyle’s Law concerns pressure (and thus force) 
and volume; and so on. On the other hand, there are a number of proposi-
tions which have been accepted in science, at one time or another, as express-
ing laws of nature which do not, or need not, affirm or imply the existence 
of forces. These include the law of the conservation of matter, the statement 
of Snell’s Law concerning the angles of incidence and refraction of a wave, 
the law-statement of special relativity according to which (necessarily) the 
speed of light in a vacuum is constant in all inertial frames of reference, and 
the statement of the law of gravity in general relativity which dispenses with 
force in favour of space-time curvature; also, in quantum physics the EPR/B 
experiment appears to describe situations in which the motions of separate 
microphysical particles are related by a quantitative law of nature even though 
there can be no forces acting between them to bring about the result.
4. Dispositions
Robinson claims that a dispositional account of obligation has explanatory 
superiority over a moral-law account. He implies that accounts of obliga-
tion in terms of moral law accept the pro-tanto character of obligations as a 
brute, inexplicable feature of the moral domain, and he says that, in contrast, 
his dispositional account of obligation provides the desiderated explanation 
(2014: end of section 5).
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On his dispositional account (Robinson 2008: 1–2; 2011; 2013: sec-
tions 3–7; 2014: sections 6 and 7), moral agents and patients have disposi-
tions to generate pro-tanto obligations. For example, a child drowning in a 
nearby pool may be a circumstance in which Tom’s disposition to be pro-
tanto-obligated to help people is triggered; and Tom’s promise to take Geri to 
the ball was a circumstance in which he exercised his disposition to obligate 
himself by promising, which disposition manifested in his pro-tanto obliga-
tion to take Geri to the ball. This is analogous to the fact that, barring finks 
and antidotes (see Bird 2005: section 4), striking a brittle object triggers its 
disposition to break, or salt immersed in water manifests its disposition to 
dissolve. Robinson stresses the analogy between moral dispositions and those 
causal dispositions which generate forces, as a body with gravitational mass 
has a disposition to exert a gravitational force on an object if that object is 
within its gravitational field. This analogy, he says, permits an explanation of 
the possibility of pro-tanto obligations which make possibly conflicting con-
tributions to deontic outcomes, because forces may vary in magnitude, may 
conflict with each other, and often interact to determine physical outcomes. 
For example, a refrigerator magnet is subject to a magnetic force pulling it 
toward the door of the refrigerator and a gravitational force pulling it toward 
the floor; but it adheres to the door because the former force is stronger. He 
says that, just as some theorists maintain that causal dispositions are irreduc-
ibly dispositional properties that are the metaphysical grounds of causation 
and causal laws, so moral dispositions are irreducibly dispositional properties 
of moral persons that ground the obligations of moral agents and that entail, 
engender or otherwise guarantee ceteris-paribus moral laws. As he puts it 
(2014, section 6), ‘dispositions are ontologically more basic than laws.’
It hardly seems an explanation of the possibility of pro-tanto obligations 
merely to point out some analogies between them and physical forces. Fur-
ther, insofar as we accept that as an explanation, it is one that can be invoked 
by the theorist who assimilates moral laws to laws of nature. We noted, in 
section 3, that an adherent of the necessary-relationship account of laws of 
nature can welcome forces into his ontology and that in science it is com-
monly accepted that some laws of nature are relationships between forces and 
other things. Thus, insofar as Robinson’s dispositional account can explain 
how obligations can be pro-tanto, by appealing to an analogy with forces, a 
necessary-relationship moral-law account can do so too.
Indeed, it seems that talk of dispositions can always be re-phrased as talk 
about laws, so long as such laws are construed as necessary relationships. Thus, 
Bird (2005) argues that the counterfactual analysis of dispositions can be 
saved, provided the counterfactual conditional is qualified with a ceteris-pari-
bus clause which allows for the finks and antidotes of the disposition. There-
fore (Bird 2005: end of section 2, and section 5), assuming the dispositional 
nature of properties to be essential, the truth of a statement of the form
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anything which has the disposition, D, will manifest M in response to 
stimulus S, barring finks and antidotes
entails the truth of the corresponding statement of the form
necessarily, anything is such that, if it is D and is subject to S, and other 
things are equal, then it manifests M.
The latter statement-form exemplifies our standard form of a statement of a 
ceteris-paribus law of nature, (L’). For example, Galileo’s false law-statement,
anything which is an unsupported terrestrial body has a disposition to 
fall to earth with a constant acceleration,
can be alternatively expressed as,
necessarily, anything, x, is such that, if x is an unsupported terrestrial 
body and other things are equal, then x falls to earth with a constant 
acceleration,
which has the form of (L’). So, whenever Robinson explains something about 
obligations in terms of dispositions, it seems there will always be a counter-
part explanation in terms of laws construed as necessary relationships.
Robinson seems to grant that a dispositional explanation will always have 
a nomological counterpart when he affirms that dispositions ‘entail, give rise 
to, or otherwise guarantee laws’ (2008: 2). However, what he there means by 
‘laws’ is mere Humean regularities, and he quite rightly insists that Humean 
regularities are not explanatory (2011: 296–97). If he had not overlooked the 
necessary-relationship conception of laws, he might have seen the connection 
between dispositions and genuine laws of nature.
It is possible that someone could grant the necessary-relationship concep-
tion of laws, and that disposition-talk can be translated into law-talk, yet still 
contend that dispositions are ontologically more basic than laws. Such a per-
son might think that laws cry out for explanation in a way that dispositions do 
not. But why should anyone think that? Plainly, such a person would be more 
comfortable with talk about dispositions than with talk about laws and may 
need to translate the latter into the former before she feels that she properly 
understands it. However, other people may take the opposite view, finding 
talk of laws (understood as necessary relationships) more natural than talk of 
dispositions. But if dispositions are just laws by another name, we can explain 
phenomena either by invoking a law or by invoking a disposition. If so, Robin-
son’s preference for the latter kind of explanation appears to be purely verbal.
It has been claimed that some laws of nature do not have corresponding 
dispositions. Claims of this sort have been made for laws involving funda-
mental constants, conservation and symmetry laws, least-action principles, 
313D. FREDERICK: Moral Laws, Laws of Nature and Dispositions
and laws relating properties (such as inertial and gravitational mass) which 
are embedded in distinct laws. These claims are contested, but some of them, 
particularly the last, are admitted to pose difficulties for the dispositional 
view by advocates of that view (see Bird 2005: sections 6 and 7). If at least 
one of these claims turns out to be true, then, while every disposition will 
correspond to a law, some laws will not correspond to dispositions. This, it 
might be held, would make laws rather than dispositions ontologically more 
basic. If that is so, then Robinson’s preference for dispositional rather than 
nomological explanation is mistaken rather than merely verbal.
5. Conclusion
There is a strong analogy between moral principles and ceteris-paribus laws 
of nature, which enables our understanding of the latter to illuminate the 
former. An important disanalogy is that statements of moral principles entail 
statements about how people ought to behave rather than statements about 
how people will behave. Still, the fact that statements of laws of nature which 
require ceteris-paribus conditions can be explanatory promises to throw light 
on how moral principles with ceteris-paribus conditions may be action-guid-
ing and perhaps also how they may be tested.
Robinson objects that an account of moral principles as analogous to 
laws of nature either cannot explain how moral principles can be necessary 
or cannot explain how obligations can be pro-tanto. However, the objection 
overlooks the conception of laws of nature as necessary relationships. Rob-
inson claims that a dispositional account of obligation has greater explana-
tory merit than a nomological account. However, the claim is spurious, since 
dispositional explanations seem easily transformable into nomological ones. 
Further, Robinson’s preference for grounding obligations in moral disposi-
tions rather than in moral laws (construed as necessary relationships) seems 
mistaken if it is not purely verbal.
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